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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
NEGOTIABILITY OF A CONFESSED JUDGMENT
NOTE PAYABLE ON DEMAND
Iglehart v. Farmers National Bank'
Defendant-appellant endorsed two notes executed by an-
other person to plaintiff-appellee. The notes were payable
"on demand after date" and authorized confession of judg-
ment "at any time before maturity".2 Judgment by con-
fession having been entered against both the maker and de-
fendant, he moved to strike out the judgment, contending,
inter alia, that the notes were negotiable, wherefore he was
entitled, as an indorser, to notice of dishonor, in the absence
of which he was discharged. From an order overruling his
motion to strike out the judgment, defendant appealed.
Held: Affirmed. (On rehearing, affirmed by a divided court
without opinion.) The note was non-negotiable since it con-
tained a power to confess judgment at any time. Since it
was non-negotiable, defendant, having signed his name on
the back of the instrument at the time of its issuance, was a
joint maker, and as such he was not entitled to notice of
dishonor.
The Court applied the rules that a time note which is
payable at the uncontrolled whim or caprice of the holder
is non-negotiable,' and that the anomalous indorser4 of non-
negotiable paper is a co-maker.5 Conceding the correctness
of the latter rule (it should be noted that the instant case is
1 197 A. 133, rehearing 200 A. 833, 117 A. L. R. 667 (Md. 1938); noted
(1938) 24 Va. L. R. 921; and 117 A. L. R. 673 (1938). The latter anno-
tation pays no attention to the fact that the notes were payable on demand.
2 The notes read as follows: "Joint and several note. Annapolis, Md.,
............ , 192  On demand after date, for value received we jointly
and severally promise to pay to the Farmers National Bank of Annapolis.
or order ............ dollars, negotiable and payable at said bank; and
agree upon defalcation, to pay an attorney's fee of ten per cent; and
hereby authorize any attorney of record to appear for us in any court, or
before any Justice of the Peace, at the suit of the holder, and confess
judgment in favor of said holder for the amount due, with interest and
costs. And authorize any Justice of the Peace or Clerk of any Court to
enter judgment for any amount due on this note, within his jurisdiction,
without appearance of attorney; waiving all exemptions. And whenever
in the judgment of the holder of this note, It may become necessary, for his
or its protection, we authorize entry of judgment against us at any time
before maturity of this note."
8 The confessed judgment cases are the only acceleration cases that have
arisen in Maryland to date.
'An Irregular or anomalous indorsement is one made by a person not a
party to the instrument, before Its delivery or indorsement by the payee,
and does not transfer the instrument. 10 C. J. S. 692.
Nussear v. Hazard, 148 Md. 345, 129 A. 506 (1925), 10 C. J. S. 441.
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one of the few places in the law of Bills and Notes where
the obligor is in a better position by virtue of the negotiabil-
ity of the note), questions are, nevertheless, raised as to
the soundness of the former rule and as to the propriety of
its application in the principal case.
The cases are legion which hold that time paper payable
at the uncontrolled whim and caprice of the holder is non-
negotiable.' Despite the fact that the rule is firmly im-
bedded in the law, and arises out of the wording of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, it creates a definite
and somewhat arbitrary inconsistency in the law. It is said
that for an instrument to be negotiable it must be payable
on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time. Cer-
tainty of time of payment is apparently made the criterion
of negotiability, but it is obvious that demand paper, which
is concededly negotiable, is the most uncertain form of paper
from point of view of time of payment. If it be answered
that the law distinguishes between time and demand paper,
it may be said that there is no apparent reason why such
distinction should be made, for there is no greater uncer-
tainty as to time of payment of a note payable at a specified
time or earlier at the option of holder or maker, and demand
paper which, perforce, is payable at the option of the holder.
The policy of the law as concerns bills and notes is in
favor of negotiability, that is to say, it favors that form of
instrument which will circulate most readily and easily in
the market. Consistent with such a policy is the rule that
paper payable on the happening of an uncertain contingency
such as the arrival of a ship, or the coming of age of the
payee, or the election to office of the maker, or when the
maker is able,7 is non-negotiable, since no business man
would invest his funds in such paper, uncertain as it is as to
the time of repayment and also as to whether repayment
is to be made at all. But, viewed in the light of such a
policy, a note the payment of which the holder is assured of
at a specified time, or earlier at his option, should be ac-
corded negotiability. It thus becomes apparent that the
rule of the law merchant and of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law that "an instrument to be negotiable must
be payable on demand or at a fixed or determinable future
time" relates more to certainty as to whether the instru-
ment will ever be payable, than to certainty as to when it
will be payable. If it be said that a note payable at the un-
S10 C. J. S. 544, ff., and notes.
10 C. J. S. 547, Sec. 97.
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controlled option of the maker would be unmarketable,
though apparently negotiable under a rule disregarding
certainty of time of payment, it may be answered that such
an instrument is uncertain not only as to time of payment
but also as to whether it will be payable at all. The, view
contended for is even more strongly substantiated by those
cases which hold that the length of time an instrument is to
run has, in the absence of statute, no effect on its negotiabil-
ity. Thus if legal negotiability is not affected (though
marketability would be) by the fact that an instrument may
be payable in the far distant future, so long as the instru-
ment is certain of payment at some time, there is no reason
why legal negotiability should be affected by a provision
that an instrument, certain as to payment, may become pay-
able at an earlier time than that specified as its due date
(which can only have the effect of increasing its market-
ability).
In addition to the fact that the rule as it now exists is
the result of an incorrect construction of the phrase "pay-
able at a fixed or determinable future time", the various
constructions applied in different situations are themselves
inconsistent. Questions as to certainty of time arise under
the conventional rule when the instrument provides that it
is payable "on or before" a named date, upon the happening
of a named event, at a named date or earlier if the holder
deems himself insecure, at a named date or earlier if the
maker defaults in the payment of an instalment or of inter-
est, or at a named date or earlier if the holder exercises a
power to confess judgment." The majority of the cases
hold that a note payable "on or before" a named date is
negotiable since the promise to pay on the date fixed re-
mains absolute, and also since the Negotiable Instruments
Law provides that an instrument may be made so payable.'
However, while it is factually true to say that, under the
provisions giving the holder rather than the maker the op-
tion to accelerate payment, the promise to pay at a fixed
date is abrogated by acceleration, yet this is rather to deal
in words than results. It is obvious that there is still an
absolute promise to pay, of which, by acceleration, advant-
age has been taken. While it is true that where the option
is the maker's, rather than the holder's, the maker is pro-
No account is here taken of provisions for extension of time, also in-
volving a certainty of time problem. The Instant discussion Is limited to ac-
celeration questions.
9 10 C. J. S. 549.
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tected against a call for payment when it would be unfor-
tunate, financially, for him to have to pay; yet it is also true
that the maker has so contracted of his own free will.
A note payable upon the happening of a named event
may or may not be negotiable accordingly as the event is
bound to happen (as death) or morally certain to happen
(as the ending of a war), or may never happen (as the com-
ing of age of the payee). 1° As indicated above, the actual
factor which determines negotiability here is not when the
note will be payable, but whether it will ever be payable at
all.
It is generally held that a note payable at a named day or
earlier if the maker defaults in the payment of an instal-
ment or of interest is negotiable." On the other hand a
note payable at a named day or earlier if the holder deems
himself insecure is usually held non-negotiable, 2 although
there is authority to the contrary. A note payable at a
named date or earlier if the holder exercises a power to con-
fess judgment is almost universally held non-negotiable. 3
In each of these cases, the element of uncertainty of time is
equally present, but a differentiating factor is found in the
fact that the instrument may or may not be accelerated at
the holder's uncontrolled option. Although, in the case of
a confessed judgment note, the maker may be protected
from the possibility of having to pay twice by a holding that
the note is non-negotiable, nevertheless negotiability is a
matter of protection of the holder rather than the maker.
Therefore, the fact that acceleration is at the uncontrolled
option of the holder has no apparent effect on negotiability,
and none is set forth by the cases.
It is thus apparent that, with the exception of notes pay-
able upon the happening of an event neither absolutely nor
morally certain to happen (and which are therefore possibly
not payable at all) the only instruments of the types above
enumerated which are held non-negotiable are those provid-
ing for confession of judgment or acceleration when the
holder deems himself insecure, although in every instance
the element of uncertainty as to the exact time at which the
instrument will be payable is equally present. The conclu-
sion, therefore, can only be that not only have the courts,
blinded by precedent, announced and enforced an incorrect
1010 C. J. S. 547.
11 10 C. J. S. 551.
12 10 0. J. S. 553.
13 10 C. J. S. 549.
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rule, but that even in its enforcement the courts have been
inconsistent in their holdings.
Conceding, for the purpose of the remaining discussion,
the existence of the general rule above criticized, was it
properly applied in the instant case? Under this given
rule, it is held that a time note authorizing confession of
judgment after maturity is negotiable, although, in such a
note, authorization to confess judgment before maturity ren-
ders the instrument non-negotiable.' 4 . This view has been
followed in Maryland." The particular point of the instant
case, the negotiability of a confessed judgment note payable
on demand, is however one of first impression in the Mary-
land Court of Appeals, and indeed, has apparently arisen in
only one other state.'6
The line of demarcation which determines negotiability
vel non as concerns time paper being whether or not judg-
ment may be confessed before or after maturity, an inquiry
concerning the time of maturity of a note payable "on de-
mand after date'I is essential, for if such a note be time
paper then the court correctly applied the general rule.
While the opinion in the principal case did not discuss the
time of maturity of the notes, the only possible inference is
that the Court regarded them as maturing at some time
after the date of delivery, 18 for in holding them non-nego-
tiable the Court said :19
"It seems to us that there is no ambiguity in their
meaning, and that their effect is to leave to the discre-
tion of the holder the determination of the time at which
judgment might be entered, thereby making it possible
14 10 C. J. S. 538.
15 Edelen v. First National Bank of Hagerstown, 139 Md. 422, 115 A. 602
(1921) (after maturity) ; Crothers v. National Bank, 158 Md. 587, 149 A.
270 (1929) (before maturity). The problem of the negotiability of a con-
fessed judgment note was incidentally involved in Johnson v. Phillips,
143 Md. 16, 21-22, 122 A. 7 (1923).
" Pennsylvania. Lozier v. Admy, 5 Pa. Dist. & Co. 69 (1924). See also:
Miner's State Bank v. Auksztokalnis, 283 Pa. 18, 128 A. 726 (1925) which
held such a note non-negotiable, its lack of negotiability having been con-
ceded.
27 It should be noted here that photostatic copies of the notes show them
to have been form notes which read, after the date line, "............. after
date" and that the "on demand" was written in on this printed form at
the time of execution of the notes. From this it is at least a plausible
inference that the notes were intended to be simply demand notes, and that
the additional words "after date" were not intended to have any effect
whatsoever.
"9 Rather than immediately upon delivery, as is the case with an ordinary
demand note. See infra note 24 and text of this note to which it relates.
19 197 A. 133, 136.
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that the judgment could have been entered on the note,
upon the warrant of attorney, at any time either before
or after the maturity thereof."2 °
Such a view is substantiated by at least one case which is on
all fours with the principal case,2 but it is submitted that
both cases are clearly contrary to the weight of authority.
That notes payable "after date", "on demand after
date", "on demand next after date", "on demand, after
date, without grace" are payable on demand has been the
consistent holding of many courts.22 Of the many cases to
be found so holding, the parent case is Hitchings v. Ed-
mands.23  That case held a note payable "on demand after
date" was not a note payable on time, in the face of a con-
tention that the additional words "after date" had the effect
of excluding the day of delivery. In so holding the Court
said that the words "on demand after date" were more
nearly analogous to such an expression as "with interest
after date" and that if a promissory note payable on de-
mand with interest after date is paid the next day after it is
given, one day's interest is due and payable. Further, the in-
tention of the parties to the note was apparently that it
should be payable immediately, no indication appearing on
the face of the note that the parties intended to stipulate for
at least one day's time before a demand could be made.
The inclusion within the notes of the words "after date"
therefore had no effect on its date of maturity, which was
the same as that of any other demand note. For the pur-
poses of determining whether the holder has acquired the
note after maturity, or when the note is due as concerns
20 Italics ours. This inference is further substantiated by the Court's
quotation from 7 Am. Jur. 892 (see 197 A. 133, 136). The sentence pre-
ceding the part quoted by the Court reads "According to the weight of
authority, however, a note which, while purporting to be due and payable at
a fi.ed time after date, contains a provision authorizing a confession of
judgment "in favor of the holder 'at any time thereafter' is not negotiable
under the law merchant". (Italics ours.) It is apparent that the section
was dealing with the case of a note other than one which matures Immedi-
ately upon execution, I. e., with time paper.
-1 Lozier v. Admy, supra note 16, where the note contained tue same pro-
visions as in the instant case, and the Court said, "Judgment could have
been entered on this note upon delivery, but payment could not have been
demanded until the following day. Therefore, the judgment could have
been entered before maturity, and this destroys the negotiability of the
note." 10 C. J. S. 538 n. 44 cites also, in support of this proposition, Kaszer
v. Breyer, 156 A. 632, 102 Pa. Super. 315 (1931) but the reports of that case
do not show whether the note was a demand or a time note. It is signifi-
cant, however, that neither the opinion of the Court, nor briefs of counsel
for either party contains any citation to these Pennsylvania cases.
-2 See cases cited 8 C. J. 404, n. 54, 55; 10 C. J. S. 742, n. 16. 17, 18, 19;
and Kenyon v. Youngland, 40 F. (2d) 812 (C. of A., D. C.).
"1132 Mass. 338 (1882).
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the question of presentation, demand and notice of default,
a demand note is held to mature after a reasonable time,
and what is a reasonable time varies even as between these
two situations. However, for the purpose of determining
when limitations begin to run, i. e., when suit may be main-
tained on the instrument, a note payable on demand is due
immediately, without any other demand but the suit, unless
a different intention is appparent from the terms of the in-
strument or the purposes and circumstances of the transac-
tion. 4 While it may be argued that the provision of the
note in the principal case for confessed judgment "at any
time before maturity" shows another intention, it is sub-
mitted that such a contention is not well founded, especially
in view of the fact that that particular wording was in the
printed part of a form note. The conclusion, therefore, is
that the note was a demand note, payable and maturing
immediately.
That a provision for confessed judgment should not
render non-negotiable such a note, if not a readily apparent
proposition of itself, is one which finds support in Security
and Trust Co. v. Foster.25 There a demand note providing
that the holder could declare the note due whenever it
deemed itself insecure was held negotiable, the Texas Court
reasoning as follows:
"In behalf of this objection many cases have been
cited wherein notes containing provisions the same or
similar to the ones incorporated in the present note
have been held to render the same non-negotiable under
the N. I. L. The ground of these decisions is that the
date of payment is thereby made uncertain, and is
wholly dependent upon the will or caprice of the holder.
But in every case so holding which has been cited, the
note was payable upon a day fixed and certain. In
such a note it is readily apparent that a provision which
gives to the holder the right to declare the same due
whenever he deems himself insecure .. .injects the
element of complete uncertainty in the maturity date,
and in effect makes it dependent upon the will of the
holder, and thus comes in conflict with that provision of
the act which requires that an instrument to be nego-
tiable 'must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or de-
terminable future time'.
2, 10 C. J. S. 744 and n., 8 C. J. 406. n. 83 and cases cited, and Blick v.
Cockins, 131 Md. 625, 630, 102 A. 1022 (1917).
11249 S. W. 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). See also: City Nat. Bk. v.
Roberts, 165 N. E. 470, 266 Mass. 239 (1929).
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"But the present note is payable upon demand, and
no case has been cited wherein such a note was held to
be non-negotiable upon the ground indicated. In such
a note by its terms there is complete uncertainty as to
the date it is payable, and it is wholly dependent upon
the holder's will. Provisions of the character indicated
add nothing to the element of uncertainty, and the rea-
son for the rule of decision announced in cases of notes
payable at a fixed or determinable future time has no
application. The reason for the rule failing, the rule
should also fail."
Again, in First National Bank v. Blackman,2 the New
York Court said:
"The volition of the holder or maker of demand
paper is complete; the former may at will declare the
paper presently payable; the latter may presently pay
if he elects so to do. Self-evidently that which is in-
stantly payable, at the will of either of the parties, can-
not, through a so-called acceleration clause, be rendered
more immediately payable. Therefore, the essential
nature of an obligation 'payable upon demand' is not
affected by an acceleration clause."
It is particularly apparent that the notes in the instant
case should not have been held non-negotiable, when it is
seen that the use of the words "at any time before matur-
ity" was occasioned by the use of form notes. It may there-
fore be said that this provision was inserted purely acci-
dentally, and that had the provision for confession of judg-
inent been limited to "at or after maturity" the notes would
have been held negotiable, although the contracts would
have been the same in either case.
In conclusion it is submitted that the usually recognized
policy for negotiability should have been followed in the in-
stant case, and that the notes in question should have been
held negotiable instruments. Regardless of the propriety
of such a conclusion, it would seem that the Court should not
have inferentially propounded the metaphysical brain-
twister, "when is a demand note not a demand note?" with-
out giving some further answer than simply "when it con-
tains provision for confession of judgment before matur-
ity". Some recognition of the true problem in the case, the
date of the maturity of a note payable "on demand after
16 164 N. E. 113, 249 N. Y. 322 (1928).
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date", was necessary to the rendition of a complete decision
of the cause. While, in view of the wide-spread acceptance
of the generally applicable rule that provision for accelera-
tion at the holder's uncontrolled option defeats negotiabil-
ity, the Court cannot be fairly criticized for blindly follow-
ing it rather than inquiring into its reason and soundness;
yet the affirmance and reaffirmance of the lower court's deci-
sion can only be characterized as an erroneous application
of a dubious rule.
It is to be regretted that no more than four of the mem-
bers of the Court could be persuaded to recognize that the
decision on the original argument of the case was an obvi-
ous mistake which, as a result, has become perpetuated un-
der the rule that an even division of an appellate court
causes an automatic affirmance of the ruling before them.
EFFECT OF ACQUITAL FOR. ASSAULT ON TRIAL
FOR MURDER WHEN VICTIM SUB-
SEQUENTLY DIES
Crawford v. State'
The defendant-appellant was indicted for murder by
the grand jury of Baltimore City. To this indictment he
filed a special plea to the effect that he had been arraigned
before a magistrate charged with "Assaulting and shooting
Loretta Anderson (c), age nine months, with a pistol in
Baltimore City, State of Maryland, on August 7, 1937," and
that after a full and complete hearing before the magistrate
he was found not guilty, and that the assaulting and shoot-
ing of which he was thus found not guilty was the same
assaulting -and shooting alleged to have later caused the
death for which he was charged in the indictment for mur-
der. A demurrer to this plea was sustained. The defendant
was tried and convicted of second degree murder by the
court sitting as a jury.
Defendant contended, upon appeal, that the court erred
in sustaining the demurrer, relying solely upon the doctrine
of res judicata; that since he was found not guilty of the
crime of which he was charged before the magistrate, his
acquittal created an estoppel by judgment which barred
the State from prosecuting him upon a more serious charge
growing out of the less. Against this the State made two
contentions, (1) that the magistrate had no jurisdiction
1197 A. 866 (Md. 1938).
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